This paper examines the young Kant's claim that all motion is relative, and argues that it is the core of a metaphysical dynamics of impact inspired by Leibniz and Wolff. I start with some background to Kant's early dynamics, and show that he rejects Newton's absolute space as a foundation for it. Then I reconstruct the exact meaning of Kant's relativity, and the model of impact he wants it to support. I detail (in Section II and III) his polemic engagement with Wolffian predecessors, and how he grounds collisions in a priori dynamics. I conclude that, for the young Kant, the philosophical problematic of Newton's science takes a back seat to an agenda set by the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of rationalist dynamics. This results matters, because Kant's views on motion survive well into the 1780s. In addition, his doctrine attests to the richness of early modern views of the relativity of motion.
Introduction

* W
hen Isaac Newton's Principia came out in 1687, natural philosophers on the Continent were quick to recognize the extent of its achievement. Some of them, though, found it hard to share all of Newton's assumptions. One was that space exists distinct from bodies. Another was his account of true-as opposed to merely apparent-motion: Newton analyses it as change of place in absolute space, hence as absolute motion. 1 Leibniz and Huygens wrote to each other in agreement that Newton was surely mistaken on this point. "I have reasons to believe that nothing breaks the general law of Equivalence [of hypotheses about which bodies move]," said Leibniz; previously, he had been blunter: "motion is not something absolute, but relative."
2 He shares Huygens' sentiment: "[That all motion is relative] I hold to be always true, and I am not impressed by the arguments and experiments of Newton in his Principles of Philosophy, whom I know to be wrong," had declared the Dutchman. 3 In calling all motion relative, Leibniz and Huygens echoed Descartes. Half a century before, he had asserted that each body has a true, or 'philosophical,' motion relative to bodies immediately surrounding it.
Leibniz gave voice to his criticism in letters to Henry Oldenburg, who relayed it to Huygens, hoping that he might be able to answer it:
For [Leibniz] seems to think that neither you nor Mr. Wren have assigned the causes of these Phenomena that you examined in establishing your rules [of impact].
9
Huygens would not be drawn into the investigation. Two years earlier, Oldenburg had asked him the same question, pressed by William Neile. At the time, Huygens had granted that reasoning on the causes of motion is "subtle," but objected that it is "very metaphysical." 10 And he thought that the metaphysical principles underlying the mechanism of impact, while probable [verisimile] , cannot however be demonstrated with any certainty: "As to the reason that Mr. Neile demands-why a body gives motion to another body that it collides with-I do not think that it can be found by means of the better known principles."
Leibniz's dissatisfaction with kinematic rules of impact comes from their lack of explanatory import; in this sense, they leave the communication of motion obscure, as Locke had complained. But Leibniz had a second reason for discontent, echoing Locke's accusation that it is also incomprehensible. In all impact, it appears that 'motion' has been transmitted from one body to another. 11 The rules of impact confirm it quantitatively: in a collision, one body loses as much momentum as the other one gains. But surely, objected Leibniz, there can be no literal communication of motion: a body's motion -be it speed, velocity or momentum -is a property of the body itself, just like its shape and size. To affirm that, in impact, motion is literally transferred is to suppose that properties could migrate from one substance into another. That is absurd; there can be no genuine transfer of properties:
I am not surprised if you find insurmountable difficulties where you seem to assume something as inconceivable as the passing of an accident from one subject to another… It is not true that a body loses as much motion as it gives to another; which seems to be conceived as if motion were a substantial thing and resembled salt dissolved in water.
(2) It requires that kinematic regularities about changes of motion in impact be grounded in dynamical laws or claims about forces.
The post-Leibnizian consensus In Germany, Christian Wolff strove to carry out Leibniz's mandate in metaphysical dynamics, though he was no slavish follower. In cosmologia generalis of 1731, he is eager to present impeccable mechanist credentials: "[i]n bodies, there can be no change unless by motion." 18 Predictably, Wolff also rejects action-at-a-distance: "A body cannot act upon another one unless it pressed against it [in ipsum impingit]." Impact and pressure are thus the fundamental forms of interaction between bodies; collisions retain the central role they had in Leibniz's mechanics, so they must be freed of problems.
Wolff makes good on Leibniz's first demand by depicting impact as an encounter between forces rather than motions. Material bodies are all endowed with three 'cosmological' attributes: extension, force of inertia, and active force. Ultimately, all corporeal change must be reduced to them and their laws. 19 When a body is in motion, its active force manifests itself as 'moving force' [vis motrix]; stationary bodies are passive, and by their force of inertia resist moving bodies that collide with them: "The principle of resistance to motion in bodies is called Force of inertia, or passive Force." 20 Together, these two forces suffice to explain what occurs in impact. When a moving body collides with another one at rest, the former exerts a striving [nisus] to change the latter from rest to motion. Thereby, it uses up a part of its moving force in order to overcome the latter's resistance: "In an action, each body expends that part of its force which suffices to overcome the [other body's] resistance." 21 With the moving force left over, the first body then pushes the second along, now devoid of resistance. If both are in motion but collide with unequal moving forces, the body with the greater force will defeat the lesser one; with the remaining force, it will then push it along, hence the two bodies will move together: "motion ensues in the direction of the stronger or greater [body] ." 22 Finally, when two bodies collide with equal force, they come to rest relative to each other. This is because, their forces being equal, "there is no obvious reason" why one should begin to move along with the second rather than the other way around. Thus Wolff eschews the trouble of explaining how motion may be communicated, since no such transfer really occurs. Impact is first and foremost a dynamical interaction, not a purely kinematic process. It is an encounter between forces inherent in bodies, struggling to overcome one another. Motion only appears to have been transferred in impact; but that is just because one body expends as much moving force trying to move the other body as the latter uses up in resisting the former's efforts. The changes in the momenta of both are equal.
'Dynamicizing' collisions is just the first half of Wolff's foundational enterprise. He completes it with an effort to explain the kinematic change of motion in impact, to meet Leibniz's demand that the Wallis-Wren-Huygens regularities be explained. To that end, Wolff distinguishes between mere rules and proper laws of motion.
23
"The rules of motion we call those according to which the moving force [vis motiva] is modified in the collision of bodies."
24 In Wolff, modifications of motive force are changes in a body's 'celerity,' or speed. Hence, the 'rules of motion' are exactly the laws of impact discovered in the second half of the 17th century. 25 In contrast, "laws of motion are called the general principles of the rules of motion." These principles "lie in" [inesse] the rules of motion, which can be derived from them, he alleges. "These laws of motion Mathematicians assume, but do not prove; yet it behooves the Metaphysician to demonstrate them."
26 A law of motion, for Wolff, is grounded in the ontology of body and force, and must be derivable a priori from it; mere induction cannot yield proper laws of motion. In general cosmology, he offers two such laws: a principle of inertia, and a claim that reaction is contrary to action. 27 He does 'deduce' both, from metaphysical features of bodies and the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
28 However, to claim that the 'rules' of motion are derivable from the 'laws' is misleading; Wolff derives the rules, elsewhere, but the laws do not come into the derivation. 29 His laws ground the rules only in the sense that they explain in loose, qualitative terms why the motion of bodies changes at all in impact, and why their changes in momentum are equal. Transfusionism The Wolffian model of impact rests on an anthropomorphic image in which two forces clash, with the stronger overcoming the weaker. In 18th-century German natural philosophy, there was also a minority view, the so-called transfusionist picture of action by contact. Presenting it, however, is a more difficult task, because we have to rely for its reconstruction on rather hostile sources. Kant attacks it outright in his Critical years, 30 and levels obscure, terse objections to it in neuer Lehrbegriff. Still, it is not illegitimate to try and sketch the transfusionist view. Eric Watkins has already argued that supporters of physical influx, a doctrine about causation, could be expected to endorse a 'transfusionist' picture of body-on-body interactions. 31 Wolff's disciple Ludwig Philipp Thümmig, for instance, proffers a transfusionist explanation of impact. Briefly then, the view is this. When a moving body A collides with a body B at rest, it transfers, or pours into the latter, half of its 'moving force.' This is because, at the moment of impact, the two bodies A and B rest relative to each other-hence they become one body, since a body's parts are mutually at rest. Consequently, A's moving force will be uniformly distributed to all the parts of the new body AB. 32 Therefore, post impact both will move together with the same speed-just as the rules of inelastic collision predict. Yet transfusionists did not mean to say that there was any actual 'pouring over' of force in impact. Rather, they thought that the image of force flowing in from one body into another and homogeneously spreading itself throughout is a good metaphor of great use in understanding inelastic impact. 33 In any event, this much is clear: for transfusionists, there is indeed communication of motion in impact; but it must not be taken in a literal sense. Prima facie, at least, a transfusionist could claim to steer clear of Leibniz's warning that properties do not migrate across substances.
Some details in the Wolffians' effort to ground rules of impact in metaphysical laws may be fuzzy, but the idea itself is of vast importance. The young Kant is committed to the same project, as we will see presently. Moreover, Wolff's stature in the German-speaking world ensured that his metaphysics of impact congealed into a virtual consensus; Kant was among the very few to challenge it. 34 Of this shared view, three features are significant for my investigation of his theory of motion. It operates with a distinction between rules and proper laws of motion, from which the former "can and should be demonstrated."
35 Second, the Wolffians recognize only two such laws: the Principle of Inertia, and a law of action and reaction. 36 In addition, they insist that these laws are derivable a priori from ontological premises. Lastly, a metaphysical model of collision based on 'moving forces' must accompany these laws and rules. This, I believe, is the background needed to interpret Kant's neuer Lehrbegriff correctly. He articulates a new doctrine of true motion in order to remove some weaknesses in the Wolffian consensus and so improve it. Conceptually speaking, his 1758 essay on motion has three parts. In the first, he refutes the 'traditional ideas' of true motion and rest, and replaces them with an account of true motion as irreducibly relational. From his concept of relative motion, he infers two a priori laws of motion. In part II, he attacks the Wolffians' view that impact is the encounter between an active 'force of motion' and a passive 'force of inertia' (when one body is at rest in the local frame). In the last part, he tries to show that his model explains the rules of inelastic collisions.
I The New Doctrine
Before we delve into it, I must make a crucial point; talk about whether motion is 'absolute' or 'relative' tends to obscure it. Neither Kant's new doctrine, nor the theories of motion he refutes, is an account of merely apparent motion (i.e. of how bodies appear to move when seen by various observers). Likewise, they are not accounts of what speakers mean by 'motion' in ordinary, everyday-life contexts. Rather, natural philosophers in the classical age were after a concept of true motion.
37 (I give a fuller discussion of this idea when I examine Kantian relativity.) The laws of early modern science, in particular the Principle of Inertia, presuppose it. Kant too is after the nature of true motion, although he is not always explicit.
He starts polemically, with a critique of the "common concepts" of motion and rest. The received view, he continues, explicates (true) motion as change of (true) place. 38 The trouble is that, left unanalyzed, the term 'place' is ambiguous. Kant sees two possible ways for the Wolffians to explicate it, and proceeds to reject both. 'True place' can mean position relative to a body (or system of bodies) truly at rest; or it may designate a part of an immovable, container-like whole: absolute space. Some terminology is needed. Let us call the first account 'global-frame relationism': it defines true motion as change of position relative to a unique frame of reference designated by one or more distinguished bodies. 39 These objects suffice to set up a frame with respect to which we could define and measure the motion and rest of all bodies; hence the attribute 'global.' The name 'relationism' is to indicate that it analyzes, or defines, true motion in terms of relations between bodies. 40 The second option is best called 'absolutism.' Like its alternative above, it admits that all bodies have a unique quantity of true motion; in contrast, it seeks to define it as velocity relative to space metaphysically distinct from matter, thus absolute. Kant thinks he can refute both positions, ergo the claim that true motion is change of true place. 41 
Kant and the work of Bradley
He charges that global-frame relationism is empirically empty: true motion must be a true quantity, yet a rightfully privileged frame of reference is beyond our empirical reach, he accuses. Take the Earth to mark that global frame; that won't do, for the Earth truly moves around the Sun. Then maybe the Sun could be the privileged frame relative to which bodies truly move? The Sun is not good enough, either-it is not certain that the Sun is truly at rest; rather it seems to be itself in motion. Earlier in the century, James Bradley had conjectured that the Solar System as a whole might be moving relative to the fixed stars. A global-relationist's last resort would be the frame of the fixed stars. But Bradley was unable to supply a definite measure of the Sun's velocity relative to the stars; moreover, he suspected that the fixed stars may not be so fixed, after all: long-term observations suggest there is relative motion among some of them. Kant invokes Bradley to refute global-frame relationism, but he is quiet about how the astronomer might support his argument. So, a look at Bradley would shed light on Kant's own reasoning.
Astronomer Royal between 1742 and 1763, the Reverend James Bradley had set out, late in 1725, to continue observations by Robert Hooke and Samuel Molyneux aimed at Gamma Draconis, the third and brightest star in that constellation, "…in order to try whether it had any sensible parallax." 42 Detecting stellar parallax in one star-an angular displacement relative to some neighboring celestial body-serves to compute the Sun's distance to that star. Unfortunately, Bradley's repeated attempts were unsuccessful, "there appearing therefore after all no sensible parallax in the fixed stars." Though parallax eluded him, in 1727 Bradley saw another series of "change [s] in the positions of the heavenly bodies, which, by reason of their smallness, had escaped the notice of [his] predecessors." 43 The new phenomena that puzzled Bradley were a change in the angular motions of some stars-a periodic change greater than the precession of the equinoxes would predict. To explain such collective changes of relative position, Bradley investigated several explanatory hypotheses; eventually, he closed in on nutation, a previously undetected, regular wobble of the Earth's axis.
Towards the end of his paper on nutation, Bradley allows himself to go into a few methodological reflections. He remarks that settling the issue of the true cause of the astronomical phenomena he has just discussed supposes the fixed stars "have no real motion in themselves, but are at rest in absolute space." 44 But that is far from certain, worries the Reverend: long-term, ever-more accurate observations had led 18th-century astronomers to conclude that "there appears to have been a real change in the position of some of the fixed stars with respect to each other." Such changes in relative position can be the result of various causes, explains Bradley. One possible cause is "if our own solar system be conceived to change its place with respect to absolute space." It must be stressed, however, that a motion of the Solar System as a whole through space was a mere conjecture, as far as Bradley was concerned. Astronomical data and instruments at the time were too uncertain to warrant any definitive conclusions. So, "it may require the observations of many ages to determine the laws of the apparent changes even of a single star: much more difficult therefore must it be to settle the laws relating to all the most remarkable stars." On the issue of the Earth's true motion in space, Bradley's prevailing mood in his two papers was of mild pessimism. Unable to measure any parallax, he could not even determine the Earth's distance to one star. And he had no definite answer to whether the Sun really moves relative to the stars, and how much. 45 What did Kant make of these results? I submit that he took Bradley's doubts to spell the doom of global-frame relationism. He astutely objects that it is not enough to explicate true motion and rest as change of position relative to the fixed stars; for the doctrine to have empirical content, it must allow us to measure these distances, and so yield a determinate answer to the question: what is the Earth's true velocity relative to the stellar frame? And he reads Bradley's negative conclusions as undermining that possibility: neither stellar parallax nor a supposed solar translation in space is amenable to definite measurement, at least for the time being. Speaking of a sphere-about which Kant had been asking what its true motion relative to the stars might be-he concludes: "And now I get dizzy, and don't know any longer if [the sphere] rests or moves, in what direction and with what velocity." 46 Accordingly, this account of true motion-as change of position relative to a privileged, material frame of global extent-turns into a cul-de-sac: its concept of true motion is not empirically well-defined. Thus, it must be abandoned. Absolutism Next, Kant turns to the second competitor, the view that true motion is change of place in absolute space. He does not mention Newton by name, but the rejected position is clearly Newton's. Nor does he engage seriously with the Briton's arguments for absolute space, but gives it short shrift:
And even if I wanted to imagine a mathematical space, empty of all creatures, as a container of bodies, this would not help me at all. For how am I to distinguish its parts and the different places that are not occupied by anything corporeal?
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The charge is terse, but not ineffectual; it hits a weak link in Newton's foundations of mechanics. Let me expand it on Kant's behalf. If true motion is change of absolute place, we need either markers to distinguish one absolute place from another or some physical way to measure how fast a body moves between them, i.e. its velocity in absolute space. But Newton admits openly that absolute places "cannot be seen and cannot be distinguished from one another by our senses. 48 And there is no mechanical experiment-certainly none involving collisions-that could help measure a body's absolute velocity. All evidence from observing bodies in impact is insufficient to determine whether a colliding body is at rest in absolute space or moves uniformly in it with some velocity c. Absolute space is useless if one asks, as Kant does, "in which direction and at what speed" a sphere lying on a table in a ship drifting downstream really moves. Collisions between such spheres are standard examples in the mechanical philosophy, yet there is no determinate way to measure the proper velocity of each body in impact. The Wolffians' task of grounding collisions in metaphysical laws of motion cannot succeed, for their concept of true, or proper motion, is defective:
…there is something lacking in the expressions 'motion' and 'rest.' I should never use them in an absolute sense, rather always respectively [respective]. I should never say that a body rests, without adding with respect to which things it is at rest; and should never say that it moves without at the same time naming the objects with respect to which it changes its relation. 49 As a prescription for elucidating the nature of true motion, this seems baffling. After all, Kant's critique began by noting, unoriginally, that if we think of motion as change of place relative to other bodies, then our judgments are unstable: ascribing motion or rest to an object varies as we vary the particular frame of reference. Surely now he is not about to urge a return to the same predicament! It turns out that he is not. When Kant says we should not predicate motion and rest absolutely, he means we must never use them as complete, monadic predicates: to say that a body X moves simpliciter is a mistake. Rather, we ought to attribute motion to pairs. True motion does not have a single subject: it is not the true motion of a body. It is an irreducible relation between a body and another one. Still, in the actual world any one body is a member of many such pairs. Which one is distinguished as the body's true motion? The privileged pair, Kant explains, is the set of two bodies about to collide; this is because only the bodies in this pair act upon one another, and effect mutual changes. For a body in impact, all other pairings are dynamically irrelevant: "You will grant me that, when talk about the effect which the two bodies have on each other through impact, the relation to other, external things has nothing to do with it." 50 As a pair, two colliding bodies are in a relation of approach [Annäherung]; Kant sees it as a "mutual relation," in which bodies have a "share" [Anteil] . To determine each body's share, hence how much "motion" [bewegung] they have with respect to each other, he appeals to considerations of symmetry:
…tell me if one can infer, from what happens between them, that one is at rest and only the second moves, and also which of them rests or moves. Must we not ascribe the motion to both, namely in equal measure? Their mutual mARius sTAn approach may be attributed to the one just as much as to the other. Therefore, each body has an equal amount of respective motion. But there is a catch. Kant's talk about mutual approach really is about a kinematic factor: the spheres' speed relative to each other. Yet when he goes on to explain how to compute their respective (true) motions, he also takes masses into account, so as "to maintain a complete equality on both sides." Quietly, he switches to a dynamical perspective. This is for two reasons, about which he is equally silent. In general, when two unequal bodies collide, they have equal speeds only in a frame unsuitable for inertial mechanics: it is accelerated, so the rules of impact do not hold in it. Second, Kant wants an account of true motion as a dynamical magnitude, not just kinematic-because he will take it to express the true amount of 'moving force' with which the bodies interact. So, he takes the relative speed (before impact) and divides it inversely as the masses of the two bodies, then ascribes one to each body: the lower speed to the larger sphere, and vice versa. Of course, two bodies only have these particular speeds in a special frame, the center-of-mass of their impact. In that frame, he infers, they collide with equal true motion [wahrhafte bewegung], which they have only with respect to each other [respective]. Kant has carried out a conceptual analysis of true motion to conclude that it is rightly understood only as a relation between a pair of bodies, which share in it equally. The share of each is equal to its momentum in a privileged frame, in which the pair's center of mass is at rest.
Kant on impact What happens in that frame when they collide? Both objects are truly in motion, so each has a 'force' [kraft] of motion. Kant cleverly privileges the frame in which the relevant objects always have equal momenta, thus their 'forces' are equal: "both move toward each other … the one with the same force as the other." 51 Because they meet with equal forces, these "cancel each other out" [diese zwei gleichen kräfte einander aufheben]. As a result, the bodies come to mutual rest in the center-ofmass frame. It now becomes clear his topic has been inelastic collisions. They are, ultimately, encounters between two 'moving forces' that, in virtue of their equality, balance each other out. No motion is really communicated; if bodies stop after impact, it is because each one's own force has been annihilated by the other one's equal and opposite force. What is more, the Kantian picture of impact does not require two different kinds of dynamical causes, a 'force of inertia' and a 'moving force,' as it did for his German precursors. Neither body is ever truly stationary before impact, so there is no need to assume a 'force of inertia' in bodies at rest.
The Leibniz Review, Vol. 19, 2009 kAnT's eARLy TheoRy oF moTion
Now we see that his new doctrine of true motion was just a flanking maneuver to outwit the Wolffians and replace their metaphysical dynamics of impact with a leaner model. The real upshot was an improved account of collisions in terms of two forces of the same kind: two 'moving forces' present in both objects to the same extent. But Kant spends so much effort on the way to it, and is so terse about its details, that it is easy to miss. 52 He pleads he cannot be thorough in "such rich material with such narrow limits on space." But also, he did not need to be explicit about all of his assumptions. In post-Leibnizian Germany, some were taken for granted. For instance, that "the active force of bodies is called motive force, because it accompanies local motion"; for that reason, "when we posit local motion, motive force [vis motrix] is also thereby posited." 53 Or that "if two bodies strive toward each other from opposite directions with equal force, neither will move." Likewise, that "if two inelastic bodies A and B collide frontally at speeds inversely as their weights, both come to rest." Above all, Kant and the Wolffians agree that impact is eminently understandable if presented as a conflict between 'moving forces.' Kant never makes that assumption explicit because he has no intention to challenge it. His new model of impact aims to correct a tradition, not replace it.
Kantian relativity True motion, Kant insists, is always respectiv, or with regard to other bodies. Then he explains that it is a relation, hence relative. How does his view really differ from that of so many others before him who claimed motion to be relative? It does differ, rather drastically; but the language of relativity can obscure the gulf between Kant and others, and how radical his stance is.
Though not always explicitly, Descartes, Newton, Leibniz and Berkeley all assumed that, for each body taken individually, it is meaningful to ask whether it truly moves or is truly at rest. 54 This premise is threefold. 1 Almost to a man (Huygens was the great exception) these figures accepted that the phrase 'truly moves' is a complete predicate: a monadic property that is really distinguished from true rest. Hence, true motion has a single subject: it is properly predicated of individual objects. Of course, the definitions of the 1-place predicates 'true motion' and 'true rest' may employ relations; e.g., a relation to the body's immediate neighborhood or to the part of absolute space occupied by the body. But whatever relations the correct analysis of true motion may involve, the term itself is a predicate of a single argument. 55 Its reference is a property of a body, not a relation between bodies. 2 In addition, true motion and rest are real contraries: on pain of contradiction, one cannot affirm both of the same body at the same time. There are facts of the matter as to whether individual bodies move truly or are truly at rest. Some such facts are dynamical phenomena: e.g., true rotation is distinguished from rotational rest by the presence of centrifugal effects. Other facts are metaphysical; they may concern the force of bodies or their velocity in absolute space. 3 Lastly, these thinkers assumed, every body has a unique state of motion or rest. An object may move with respect to this or that body, system, or frame; but as far as its true motion is concerned, each body has exactly one.
The young Kant denies (1) and (3) explicitly. He first refutes the idea that motion is a complete predicate: "I should never use [the terms 'motion' and 'rest'] in an absolute sense…" True motion is a relation irreducible to monadic predicates, because it has no single subject. This is quite different from claiming that motion is relative in the sense that the monadic predicate 'truly moves' must be defined as motion relative to material bodies. Because for Kant (true) motion is fundamentally a relation, it is illegitimate to say of a single object that it moves. Moreover, a body does not have a unique true motion; it has as many as there are bodies dynamically related to it by an interaction. That is the gist of Kant's relativity. In the taxonomy proposed by Robert Rynasiewicz, he would count as a strong relationist.
56 Among Newton's opponents, some shared with him the conviction that true motion is a complete predicate, i.e. that motion has a single subject. They just objected to Newton's definition of it in terms of absolute places. Rather-they offered-true motion must be defined as a body's change of position relative to some privileged set of bodies. For that reason, we may call them 'weak' relationists: they stop short of denying the very idea that motion has a subject. Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley all fit this profile. 57 Ever the sharp wit, Huygens saw clearly that weak relationists are closer to Newton than they suspect: "Mariotte distinguishes the relative celerity of two bodies from their 'proper velocities.' … Thus believe all of them; and Newton too." 58 In contrast, Huygens himself was a 'strong' relationist: he thought motion has no single subject but is only meaningful when said of pairs; moreover, he thinks in collisions there is no unique quantity to single out as the two bodies' true motion. 59 Kant is already a radical in claiming, like Huygens, that motion has no single subject, but is irreducibly dyadic; as if that were not enough, he mixes it with the bold idea that bodies have true velocities in impact. It is an outlandish view, but Kant has convinced himself that only it can explain the communication of motion successfully. Let us see how he goes about that task.
Laws of motion
With the new doctrine in place, Kant infers two "corollaries." He claims they follow from it, though he never shows how to derive them. The first reads: "Every body, with respect to which another one moves, is also in motion relative to the latter; and it is impossible that a body should approach another one that is absolutely at rest." 60 Secondly, "[i]n impact, action [Wirkung] and reaction [gegenwirkung] are always equal." The signs are overwhelming that, with these corollaries, Kant continues the Wolffian tradition of a priori laws of motion. He has only two, just as they did. His first law is meant to replace their first, the Principle of Inertia (which he demotes to "a law of some phenomenon known empirically" rather than derivable from a metaphysics of body, as Wolffians would have it). A force of resisting motion, inherent in bodies at rest, is needless if the aim is to explain impact, reasons Kant. 61 He has just 'proved' that in all collisions the two bodies move equally; neither is ever truly at rest. Hence a 'force of resistance' is superfluous, and so is the metaphysical principle that codifies it: Wolff's Law of Inertia. (More on this presently.) Further, Kant's second corollary is a principle of action and reaction, just like the Wolffians' second law of motion; he merely gives 'reaction' a somewhat different meaning. Also, he seeks a priori laws of motion in order to ground collisions-by explaining the rules of impact. The same animus drives both him and the Wolffians.
His law of action and reaction deserves a gloss. Wolff and his followers had one, too, but left no room for Newton's Second Law in their foundations. 62 As a result, it is unclear what action and reaction are or how to quantify them, in postLeibnizian dynamics. They hint that action is measured by the amount of 'moving force' an active body must expend to overcome the passive body's resistance in impact. 63 Less transparent is their measure of reaction, especially if the second body is stationary, hence endowed only with a 'force of resisting' grounded in inertia. Often, the Wolffians offer obfuscation and verbiage, patently unsure about what to say; Kant steers clear of their troubles, but not by importing from Newton the concept of impressed force. Rather, he argues that no body is truly at rest in impact, so both equally move, hence they have the same amount of moving force. Ergo, the measure of both 'action' and 'reaction' is the momentum of each body in the center of mass frame of their collision. 64 They are equal because the two momenta are so. Wolff's difficulties vanish, but at a heavy price: Kant's laws of motion only hold in a special frame; the equivalence of all Galilean frames is not on his mind.
Finally, note how far all this is from Newton. The Principia rests on three laws of motion; the young Kant has only two. Impressed force is absent from his dynamics, so his Principle of Action and Reaction differs in both meaning and scope from the Third Law. At this stage, at least, Kant does not define true motion in terms of his proposed laws of motion; quite the opposite, in fact-the laws appear to be inferred from a previously articulated doctrine of motion. 65 He has designed both doctrine and dynamical laws to handle impact only, not orbital motion, as Newton did. Further, Kant dissents from Newton in spirit too, not just in letter: he aims to obtain laws of motion 'from mere concepts,' as he will put it later; the Briton was adamant that his laws could only be had by induction. 66 Add to this Kant's drastic views about the relativity of motion: not only is he not tempted by Newton's absolute space, but he rejects the very idea that true motion is change of true place, or a complete predicate. On this point, the two thinkers could not be further apart. Believers in a supposed justification of 'Newtonian' science by Kant should see all this as a challenge; but on the interpretation I have proposed, a link to Newton is predictably absent: in 1758, Kant is only after solutions to some problems in the Leibniz-Wolff agenda for metaphysical dynamics.
II Polemic Engagement
In the middle part of his essay, Kant refutes two claims: the notion that the vis inertiae is a true force of bodies, and Leibniz's law of continuity. It appears to be an unrelated insertion between two connected parts of his main topic: the nature and laws of true motion (I), and how the new doctrine grounds the rules of impact (III). Yet there is a way to read the middle part such that it fits coherently with the other two sections. I propose that the targets of section II are: first, Wolff's understanding of collision as the encounter between active 'moving force' and passive inertia; second, the transfusionist model of impact.
Against vis inertiae First, Kant rejects the notion that inertia is an inherent force in bodies at rest, conceived as a passive power to resist changes in their state of motion. Recall that a passive force of resisting-named 'force of inertia'-was part of Wolff's model of causality in impact. Kant accuses it twice: (a) it is superfluous: one does not need it to explain impact; (b) the concept of a force of inertia is incoherent. Charge (a) assumes Kant's own picture of collision and his first law of motion: in impact, neither body is truly at rest. Accept that, and the Wolffians' force of inertia becomes a needless addition; impact is an encounter of bodies in equal true motion, hence equally active:
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Now that I have shown how that which one had falsely regarded as rest with respect to the impacting body is in fact a motion relative to it [beziehungsweise], it becomes self-evident that this force of inertia was devised without any real need. Moreover, in each collision, a motion of one body is met with that of another body, which opposes the former with the same degree of motion. This explains quite easily and clearly the equality of action and reaction, and there is no need to think up a special type of natural force [naturkraft]. 67 The argument for charge (b) is that a 'force of inertia' is inconsistent with the model of impact it is supposed to explain. If a body A is at rest, Kant argues, it is in a state of equilibrium of forces, for that is a consequence of rest. Then how is A supposed to displace itself instantaneously into an imbalance of force so that, at the moment of impact, it has a force of resistance directed at the incoming body B? There has to be one, he reasons, since B slows down post collision; so, a force in A must have countered it:
But how is it that, as soon as the impacting body touches the one at rest, the latter is supposed to suddenly change itself into a state of motion or striving directed at the approaching body, in order to destroy in the latter a part of its force? 68 The notion that stationary bodies possess a force of resistance has fatal flaws, he thinks. The attack shores up his own model of impact as a clash between two equal and opposite moving forces that cancel each other.
Continuity and impact
The reasoning in the second half of Section II is more obscure. Explicitly, he argues against a version of Leibniz's Law of Continuity. This is a rich and fascinating topic, on which I cannot digress here at any length. 69 Suffice it to say that, in his essay on motion, Kant distinguishes between a logical and a physical law of continuity. He wants to retain continuity as a "logical rule"-this move is the seed of a later development: continuity as a regulative idea, in the First Critique. The "physical law" of continuity reads, according to Kant: a body does not transmit its force to another body all at once, but only so that the former transfers its force to the latter by means of all the infinitely small degrees from rest to a determinate velocity.
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This physical principle Kant wants to reject. The argument he deploys is, again, twofold: (1) the law is arbitrary; although many scientists assume it tacitly in their proofs, it can never be conclusively confirmed, but it is always easy to disprove; (2) if one assumes that a body's force is transmitted gradually through all intermediate degrees, a sort of Zeno's paradox ensues: body A would never get to transmit any force to B, since it would have to give it an infinity of intermediate degrees. Kant believes these two objections are enough to make the 'physical' Law of Continuity untenable, so he proposes to abandon it. I submit that he wants to reject it so as to undermine the transfusionists' model of impact. Kant takes it to be an essential premise in transfusionism that in collisions one body 'transfers' some of its motion to the other by degrees, hence continuously, as the Law of Continuity prescribes. Presumably, he can topple transfusionism if he disproves this premise. His reasoning on this point is extremely obscure, but I think we can reformulate the argument thus: if there really is communication of motion in impact, then the following should happen. Take two perfectly hard (i.e. rigid) bodies A and B of equal mass. Let A be at rest with respect to us, the observer, and let B approach it with a speed = 2v. If communication of motion really takes place, then we should see B come to rest, and A begin to move with speed 2v. That is because B has to transmit its 'moving force' all at once to A. But we know that this doesn't happen; what occurs instead is that both A and B move together with speed v. What is the explanation of that fact? A transfusionist, Kant implies, tacitly assumes that force is transmitted by continuous degrees, until both A and B reach the same degree of 'moving force' and then move together. But this account relies on an assumption-the physical law of continuity-that is a mere hypothesis, and can never be confirmed.
71 Dismiss the law, and transfusionism becomes untenable. Both the Wolffians and the minority opposition have thus been refuted, Kant believes. To show that his model is better, now he must put it to work.
III The Rules of Impact Explained
At last, Kant moves to fulfill the original promise: show that his theory of motion grounds the rules of impact. He thus continues the program of Leibniz and Wolff, but more soberly. The Wolffians averred that rules of impact can and should be deduced from metaphysical laws of motion; Kant only hopes to explain them by his doctrine. That is just as well, because a strict deduction requires extra premises that only induction could justify. So, he opts for a "key to the explication [erläuterung] of the laws of impact." The key has two components: (1) a dynamical model of impact in the center-of-mass frame (call it M), where two bodies truly and equally move with respect to each other-in Kant's sense of true motion. The model yields "the rules of the relation that colliding bodies enter into, with respect to each other." 72 (2)
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He also has a kinematic report of how their motion appears to an observer at rest in another frame R in uniform translation relative to M. It describes "the change of [the colliding bodies'] outer state with regard to the space in which they exist." But this change of motions relative to an observer is "only the outer phenomenon of what occurred immediately between them; and it is the latter that one needs to know," he insists. To connect the two hinges, he has an unstated principle, the composition of (uniform) motions. A body's motion relative to one frame can be compounded from (1) its motion in another frame and (2) the motion of the two frames relative to each other. 73 One component can be dynamically affected-e.g. by external forces-while leaving the other unchanged (obviously, the total composite motion changes if a component has changed). 74 He has already spelled out and defended his dynamics of impact, so he now summarizes:
What takes place, in a collision, between the two bodies mutually acting upon each other, is already clear, according to our doctrine expounded above. It is simply this: the reciprocal action and reaction of both bodies is equal, and both bodies, subsequent to the impact, come to rest relative to each other-that is to say, when they collide frontally, and if we abstract from any elastic force [Federkraft] ." 75 That holds only in the center-of-mass frame M, whereas the rules of impact predict motions as observed in other frames. Consider a sphere B of 3 pounds at rest in R and another sphere A of 2 pounds approaching it with a speed of 5 'degrees.' 76 The relevant rule of impact says that, post collision, both A and B will move together at a speed of 2 (relative to R). Kant explains the prediction thus. A's speed of 5 in R was composed of two motions: a speed of 3 relative to M and a speed of 2 that M, together with bodies in it, had relative to R. A's speed of 3 in M is 'cancelled out' [aufgehoben] by the impact with B. But their collision leaves intact M's speed relative to R; the two spheres interact with each other, not with their 'space.' Body A shared in the motion of that frame, so it still has it; that is why it moves with 2 'degrees' of speed after impact. In turn, B only appears stationary in R. Its apparent rest is the result of two equal and opposite motion: a speed of 2 relative to M, and M's own contrary speed of -2 degrees relative to R; the sphere B shares in it. Its collision with A only cancels out the former speed, but the sphere retains the latter. Hence, someone looking on in R will see B move after impact with speed 2, just as the rules of impact lead us to expect.
Thus Kant fulfills the Leibniz-Wolff mandate. In his model, there is no transfer of motion in impact, only an equality of forces; and the way they balance each other explains the subsequent kinematics of colliding bodies.
A Qualified Success
Kant's early theory is not without its difficulties. I have already complained that he operates with an ambiguous concept of motion. To prove that two bodies collide with equal 'respective' motions, he equivocates on the meaning of 'motion': he starts with premises about their relative speed, and infers that they have equal momenta. If only getting dynamics from mere kinematics were so easy! Also, it is unclear what he would say when a third body enters the picture. Take a collision between A, B, and C. What is body A's true motion? Does it have one respective to B and another one respective to C? Does it move respective to B and C together? Or would he say that each has a true motion with respect to the centerof-mass frame of the system? Some commentators do see Kant move precisely in this direction. 77 And they think that this answer, only implicit in neuer Lehrbegriff, is spelled out and strengthened through Kant's adoption of absolute space in the 1780s. But danger lurks in this reading. The peril is that it collapses into precisely the position that Kant sets out to refute in the 1758 paper: global-frame relationism, or the view that true motion is change of place (i.e. velocity) relative to a privileged global frame. For, if in a multi-body system the Kantian true motion of each is velocity relative to the center-of-mass frame, the following ensues. A mechanical system is part of a larger, more encompassing system. The latter, in turn, is also contained in an even vaster one, and so on up to the ultimate mechanical ensemble, the "systematic constitution on the great scale" of Kant's cosmology. 78 This ultimate system, including all material objects in it, will have its own center-of-mass frame, with the origin at "a mass which may serve as its fulcrum." Kant would have to say that, ultimately, each body has a unique quantity of true motion, defined as velocity relative to the center-of-mass of the world. But that is just a version of the very theory of motion Kant sets out to criticize: the view that motion is change of true place relative to a distinguished frame of global extent. If we construe Kant's reading that way, we would have to write him off as hopelessly confused.
A third shortcoming is that he makes no attempt to analyze rotation. Circular motion remained a conundrum for relationists. 79 One source of difficulty is rigid rotation: two bodies can be in true motion around each other, yet there is no change of relative distance between them. Such are the two globes connected by a chord, in Newton's Scholium to the Laws of Motion; such are the parts of a rigid body rotating in an empty universe. It is a mystery how Kant would analyze such situations or in what sense he would say they move respective each other. In 1758, he seems oblivious to their challenge. In his defense, the early concept of motion was designed for a different type of events-collisions, or interactions that always involve actual changes of relative distance. But that is a dodge of limited effect, because his early doctrine grounds only a point-mass treatment of impact. Yet that is not the only possible one, nor is it the most informative. Colliding objects can also be studied as extended bodies, rigid or deformable, not just as point masses.
In fact, at the time Euler was doing just that. 80 And the rub is that, in this enriched treatment of impact, the motion of each body is a combination of translations and rotations. Circular motion, therefore, remains inevitable. Kant will ponder it, with mixed results, much later, in metaphysical Foundations of natural science.
Lastly, his claim to novelty is more nuanced than it appears. Before him, others had resorted to the center-of-mass frame as the key to taming impact. In 1668, Wren began by declaring that, when two bodies collide, their "Velocities proper and most Natural are inversely proportional to the Bodies," i.e. their masses. 81 Around 1677, Leibniz also toyed with the idea that "if two bodies collide, the speed must be understood to be distributed between them in such a way that each runs into the other with the same force [eadem vi]." 82 Even the general tenor of Kant's project -to start with a conceptual analysis of (true) motion so as to arrive at laws of impact -has a Leibnizian precedent. Late in 1669, at work on his theory of abstract motion, Leibniz notes that, since our senses can be deceiving as to the nature of motion, we must investigate it by reason [ratione]. The "reasons of motion," he follows, must be demonstrated "not from matters of fact or the testimony of senses, but from the definitions of terms." 83 Of course, Kant did not know about the young Leibniz's explorations in a priori mechanics. In any event, undeniably novel is the peculiar brand of Kantian relativity offered in neuer Lehrbegriff.
Conclusions
Kant's pre-Critical theory of motion is best understood against the background of his rationalist predecessors in Germany, notably Leibniz and Wolff. It is a strong relationist doctrine meant to support a metaphysical dynamics of impact and laws of motion a priori. His engagement with these topics attests the influence, well into the eighteenth century, of a research agenda and conceptual resources that go back to Leibniz. Further, his case makes plain how rich and complex early modern views mARius sTAn about the relativity of motion were, and challenges us to approach them on their own terms rather than try to read modern relativity principles into their proponents. Not unimportantly, I have shown that there is no temptation to cast him as a competitor to Newton's account of true motion. Not only is the young Kant's encounter with Newtonian absolutism cursory, but he also has different ideas about what a theory of motion should do. So, to expect him to provide, in later years, an alternative to Newton's absolute space and motion would require a watershed event in his natural philosophy after 1758. If such a dramatic change of mind cannot be documented, it ought to give some pause to advocates who think that the mature Kant labored to set newtonian physics upon secure foundations. An example is needed; for ease of grasp, I shall assume two bodies of equal mass. Let sphere A be at rest in the 'lab frame' of an observer, say on a billiard table in a room, and sphere B approach it with a velocity of 4 m/s. If the two bodies are perfectly elastic, after they collide A will begin to move at 4 m/s, while B comes to rest. If they are perfectly inelastic, both will move with an equal velocity of 2 m/s. A gains as much velocity as B loses. In both cases, it strongly appears that a body's motion passes over to the other one. 12 Leibniz, new essays on human understanding, Book II, Ch. xxiii, § 28, trans. and ed. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 218.
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Conatus is just a kinematic quantity, thus insufficient by itself to explain changes in motion. To fix this, Leibniz appears to give it some causal-dynamical import: he postulates that conatus can propagate itself fully to infinite distances through all obstacles [obstantia]. As a result, when bodies collide "there can be simultaneously in one and the same body several contrary conatuses." To compute the resulting, total conatus after impact, he uses the parallelogram of velocities. Cf. "Theoria Motus Abstracti" (1670-1), in W. Kabitz 
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I chose to speak of a research program primarily because of Leibniz's demonstrable influence upon 18th century philosophy in Germany. However, pondering the mechanism whereby motion is communicated in impact also preoccupied some in Britain, for instance, where an inclination for Leibnizian dynamics was not widely shared (though a few were aware of his foundational work). See, for instance, Henry Home, "Of the Laws of Motion" and John Stewart, "Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion," both in essays and observations, Physical and Literary (Edinburgh: Hamilton & Balfour, 1754), 1-69 and 70-140. In contrast, Hutton's dictionary takes a quietist approach to the problem: "Communication of motion, or how a body in motion communicates the same to a body at rest, by coming into contact with it, is also a subject which has been as much controverted by philosophers as [the Law of Inertia], and after all, is as little understood as the continuation of motion, the cause of gravity, and other speculative inquiries of a similar nature." Cf Wolff's distinctions between active and passive bodies, moving force and force of resistance crucially depend on the possibility of drawing a well-defined distinction between true rest and true motion. Yet he never ventures to say what true motion amounts to. He does define motion as change of place; by implication, true motion must be change of true place. But there is no account of true place in Wolff's natural philosophy. A second difficulty gravely compounds his predicament. Wolff bases his typology of forces and his laws of motion on impact; however, collisions can never supply any evidence sufficient to distinguish between the true rest and true motion of bodies involved in them. That is one aspect of Galilean relativity in classical mechanics. 21 Wolff, cosmologia, § 346. Next two quotations: ibidem, § 342 and § 341. 22 Obviously, this outcome only holds for perfectly inelastic collisions. Elastic impact comes later in Wolff's account, because explaining it requires, besides the two 'cosmological' forces above, the introduction of a third element: 'elastic force.' 23 The distinction appears to pre-date him. Descartes introduces laws [leges] and rules [regulas] to handle impact, in Principles II.37-46; but he does not explain what relationship, if any, is between the two groups of statements. Also, Wolff sometimes resented being described as a Leibnizian, and we know that he owed some of his philosophical education to Cartesians, e.g. Pohl, Neumann, and Tschirnhaus: Ch. Corr, "Christian Wolff and Leibniz," Journal of the history of ideas 36(1975), 243ff. This presses the issue of whether talk of a post-Leibnizian consensus may be just post hoc, propter ergo hoc. The very brief answer is, no; whatever influence Cartesianism may have exerted on Wolff, it did not extend to the analysis of impact. Wolff's demand that the rules be derived from the laws comes from Leibniz, not Descartes. Secondly, he embeds his laws of motion in a metaphysical dynamics of forces-active and passive, moving and resisting-that is recognizably Leibnizian. See also J. Ecole, "Cosmologie wolfienne et dynamique leibnizienne," Les études philosophiques 19(1963), 3-9. 24 Wolff, cosmologia, § 302.
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Here's an example. "If in the impact of two inelastic bodies the larger body is slower whereas the smaller is faster, then the motion of both will always be retarded if the inverse ratio of their masses is smaller than the ratio of their speeds." See Wolff, cosmologia, § 407. Cf. also § 393. 26 ibidem, § 303. 27 ibidem, § 309 and § 318. I hesitate to say that Wolff's second law of motion is Newton's Principle of Action and Reaction, because it is unclear what the measure of 'action' and 'reaction' is, in Wolff's mechanics. Not so in Newton: both terms denote impressed forces, measured by Newton's Lex secunda. But Wolff lacks both the notion of impressed force and a measure for it.
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For instance, the Law of Inertia is deduced in three steps, in § § 304, 305 and 309 of cosmology. Among the premises he summons are that "All bodies resist motion" and that "the force with which a body is impelled is the sufficient reason for the actuality of motion of the movable." Cf. also § 129. 29 He deduces the rules of impact in "Elementa Mechanicae," volume II of his elementa matheseos universae (2nd edition, 1748) By the 'received view,' he means most likely the Wolffians' concept of motion. This is, for instance, how Wolff defines it: "Motion is a continuous change of place
